





THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL VALUES
SUMMARY
The problem of reciprocal demand, 582.— Advantage of variety of
exports, 586.— Gains of large and small countries, 589.— Influence of
demand for foreign products, 595.— Elasticity of demand, 600; of
supply, 607. — The case of India, 610. — Long-run and short-run fac-
tors, 612. — Conclusion, 616.
In an article published in this Journal nearly a decade
ago' I attempted, with respect to the determination of inter-
national values, to develop certain principles which deviated
rather widely from generally accepted doctrine. The article
received a generous appreciation in Professor J. W. Angell's
invaluable Theory of International Prices. 2 To Professor
Angell, however, my argument seemed to turn primarily on
the question of relative benefits from foreign trade. In this
opinion I cannot concur. The very heart of the article was,
in fact, a demonstration that the terms of international ex-
change are established not in the way posited by the neoclas-
sical school but through the play of indirect, or "linked,"
competition,' on the basis of opportunity cost. It was at that
time my impression that the orthodox theory was, in its es-
sence, fallacious and should be discarded, tho I did not then
1. "The Theory of International Values Reexamined," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, xxxviii, 54-86.
2. Harvard Economic Studies, vol. xxviii.
3. I am indebted for the phrase to a former student and colleague
of mine, Professor C. R. Whittlesey of Princeton University. See his
article, "Foreign Investment and the Terms of Trade, " Quarterly
Journal of Economics, xlvi, 460-63.
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express myself in terms nearly so emphatic. The general
outlines of an alternative, and I believe better, theory, having
been set forth in the article cited, need not here be repeated.
I propose at the present writing rather to bring out more fully
certain inconsistencies and contradictions in the neoclassical
approach and to expose what I conceive to be the vital
defects of the orthodox doctrines. 4
The accepted theory of international values turns on
reciprocal national demand for foreign products and its cen-
tral error lies in the assumption that, following lines of an
assumedly fixed comparative advantage, a given group of
commodities forms the " natural " exports of any one country
and another group its " natural " imports. The fact is, how-
ever, that the line of comparative advantage for any country
is a moving line and that, within all but the widest possible
limits, commodities may pass from the category of exports
of any given country to that of imports, or vice versa, and,
a fortiori, may simply cease to be exported or imported. 5
The line of comparative advantage, moreover, and therefore
the composition of the export and import lists of any country,
shifts in response to changes in the terms of trade, that is to
say, to changes in international values. It is, in consequence,
impossible to determine international values on the premise
of a fixed composition of export and import schedules of the
several countries reciprocally concerned. In taking this
premise the neoclassical writers' are, in fact, implicitly
4. The present discussion is to some extent inspired by an interest-
ing article by Otto Frhr. von Mering in the April 1931 issue of Archiv
fiir Sozialwissenschaft and Sozialpolitik on "Ist die Theorie der inter-
nationalen Werte widerlegt." The article in question is an ostensible
defence of the orthodox theory and an attack on my own position. In
many respects, however, von Mering concedes the validity of my argu-
ment and, if he would so permit, I should be glad to welcome him as a
colleague in the reformulation of the theory of international values.
5. This fact which, in regrettable ignorance, I thought I had been
the first to emphasize, was fully developed nearly three quarters of a
century ago by J. C. E. von Mangoldt in his Grundriss der Volkswirt-
schaftslehre.
6. The expression is used to cover writers in the classical tradition
beginning with John Stuart Mill. The orthodox theory of international
values goes back no farther than Mill.
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assuming the very ratio of interchange of products which
they are trying to discover, since the premise can be valid
only on the supposition of some definite ratio of interchange.
This defect in logic not only completely vitiates the general
theory of international values which they set up, but it also
renders useless for this, tho not for another, purpose, the
whole geometrical and algebraic supplement to the theory
which reached its apogee, perhaps, in the work of Marshall.
We could conceive of a national demand schedule for a
single imported commodity and, possibly, as Edgeworth sug-
gests,' for an "ideal" article typical of the total volume of
import or export trade, provided the composition of this ideal
article were not constantly changing. But since the latter
condition must, in fact, be the case, our intellects are not
equal to the task we would impose upon them, nor would
their indefinite improvement enable us to see verisimilitude
in what is essential error. The same criticism as applies to
Edgeworth's "ideal" article can be brought against Marshall's
"representative bales" of exports which are supposed to
embody uniform aggregate investments of a country's labor
(of various qualities) and of her capital. It must be obvious
that reciprocal demand is for individual commodities and
not for any such uniform aggregate of labor and capital as a
unit of the consolidated commodities concerned may incor-
porate, and that to construct demand schedules for repre-
sentative bales the physical composition of which is inevitably
changing as we move along the schedules, with commodities
even shifting from one demand schedule to its reciprocal, is
not only to build imaginary bricks with imaginary clay but
also to commit the worse fault of assuming a homogeneity
in the bricks which, tho a logical necessity for the construc-
tion of the demand schedules in question, is at the same time
a logical impossibility.
The character (urgency, elasticity, and the like) of recip-
rocal national demand schedules for foreign products is, as
I shall later attempt to show, of almost no importance in
7. Papers Relating to Political Economy, Macmillan & Co., Ltd.,
London, 1925, vol. ii, p. 58.
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determining long-run ratios of interchange of products (inter-
national values), but to the neoclassical writers it appeared
to be vital. Strong contributing factors to what I conceive
to be their erring approach were (1) the assumption made by
J. S. Mill, "for the sake of simplicity," of international trade
carried on between two countries only and in but two com-
modities, and (2) Mill's dictum, too slavishly accepted by
his followers, that trade among any number of countries,
and in any number of commodities, must take place on the
same essential principles as trade between two countries and
in two commodities. If this dictum were true the orthodox
theory could, I think, successfully defy criticism. But it is
not true. Not only does the assumption of trade between
two countries only, and in but two commodities, imply a
monopoly element in national reciprocal demand schedules
which might result in terms of trade very different from those
which tend to be established under competitive conditions,
but, since each of two trading countries dealing with each
other in two commodities only would be exporting that com-
modity in which its comparative cost of production was
lowest, and importing that in which it was highest, there is
no possibility that either would cease altogether to send out
its peculiar export, or to draw in its peculiar import, no
matter what the movement of the terms of trade, within the
broad limits of comparative advantage thus established,
might be. As soon as a third country, however, or a third
commodity, appears in the trading situation, the actual
terms of trade will be a factor determining comparative ad-
vantage for all the countries involved and a sufficiently wide
movement in the terms of trade (still, of course, within the
greatest limits set by comparative costs) will, where two
commodities only but three countries are concerned, reverse
the export and import articles of that one of the three coun-
tries which is in the intermediate position as regards com-
parative advantage, or, where two countries only but three
commodities are concerned, will shift one of the three com-
modities from the export to the import list of one of the
countries and so, of course, from the import to the export
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list of the other. Equilibrium will, in either case, be reached
at international values quite other than those which would
prevail were the supply of goods to foreign markets, of any
and all countries, persistently made up of units of homoge-
neous composition, or were no shift of any commodity from
the export to the import category of any country possible.
The more countries and the more commodities introduced
into the trading situation the smaller will be the movement
in the terms of trade which will bring, for the first time, any
given export into the supply schedule of some one of the
countries involved, or any given import, for the first time,
into the demand schedule of some other, or shift an article
hitherto exported, or imported, by any given country, into
the opposite trade category. Each of these changes, conse-
quent upon but a slight movement in the terms of trade, will
set limits on a further movement in the ratio and when, as
is the case in the actual world, there are a large number of
countries trading in an immense variety of commodities, the
long-run equilibrium terms of trade will be held in a rather
rigid straight-jacket. In a given state and employment of
the industrial arts in the various countries concerned, the
long-run equilibrium terms of trade can, indeed, as a whole,
scarcely deviate at all from the single position which will
bring equilibrium. 8 Further than this, international values
8. This conclusion could be drawn even from the illustrations used
in my former article where only four countries and three commodities
were posited. I have since worked out some cases involving as many as
ten countries and ten commodities. The possible range of terms of
trade in a given economic environment then becomes very small. (Long-
run terms only are here in question.) Anyone who cares to experiment
with such data will quickly convince himself that, in a given state and
employment of the industrial arts in the various countries concerned,
wide long-run changes in the terms of a varied trade are quite out of
the question and that there is only one possible equilibrium set of ratios.
This is true, regardless of tariffs, unless these be extended so greatly
as practically to throttle all foreign trade and so to change materially
the preexisting employment of the industrial arts. In order that addi-
tional payments be made by one country to others some movement in
the terms of trade is, of course, essential, but it is most unlikely, and
unnecessary, that it should be large, unless such country has been
specializing very narrowly iii exports not produced by other countries.
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(terms of trade), being actually established by indirect or
linked competition between all the countries trading in world
markets, any movement in those values arising out of changes
in the employment of the industrial arts in one or more coun-
tries, in workers' relative skill, or in some other such way,
will so shift comparative advantages, and the composition of
the export and import lists of the several countries involved,
as to bring about a new equilibrium on the basis of the new
form of linked competition. The preexisting or present
" urgency " or elasticity of reciprocal demand schedules will
be an inoperative, or wholly insignificant, factor in the
situation.
In order to develop more fully the differences between the
orthodox theory and that which I essayed in my article of
1923 I shall first deal with a number of the corollaries, ex-
plicit in the orthodox presentation, which von Mering, in
the article already cited, has elected to defend against my
former rather casual objections, and I shall then go to the
central thesis, of the nature and influence of reciprocal demand
schedules, by which the orthodox theory must stand or fall.
The corollaries, of course, are all more or less dependent upon
this central thesis.
The first of such corollaries to which I would direct atten-
tion is contained in the assertion that a variety of exports is
a cause of favorable terms of trade. This corollary issues
directly from the orthodox views on the influence of demand
schedules, since it is assumed that a variety of exports means
a strong foreign demand for home products relative to the
home demand for foreign products and, therefore, a rather
good exchange ratio for the country in question. Such a
variety of exports, however, is, in my judgment, an effect of
unfavorable rather than a cause of favorable terms of trade.
In his defence of the orthodox doctrine von Mering points
out that, if a country has a variety of products which, in a
given situation, are just below the margin of export, it will
possess a safeguard against any great worsening (for it) of
the existing terms of trade. This is true and I had already
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expressly recognized the fact.' But this by no means war-
rants the conclusion that a variety of exports, as such, makes
for a favorable ratio. The fact is that a movement of the
terms of trade of any given country away from the ratio most
favorable to it will increase the number of its exports and
diminish the number of its imports. It may, in certain cases,
take but a small adverse movement of the terms of trade to
bring in a number of new exports, or exclude a number of
old imports, sufficient to establish equilibrium. But in other
cases it may take a rather heavy adverse movement to do so.
A multiplicity of exports in any given case may therefore
mean, either that many commodities have become exportable
before the terms of trade had moved very far away from the
most favorable possible position for the country in question,
or that the terms of trade had moved so far away from that
position as to bring a large number of commodities into the
export list. Every new commodity which enters the export
list will, of course, exert its influence in checking the adverse
movement in the terms, but one might as well say that the
large number of buyers who come into the market when the
price of any commodity falls far is the cause of the high (?)
price at which that commodity is selling as that a large
number of exports is the cause of the favorable (?) ratio at
which they are being exchanged. It is true that a multi-
plicity of exports prevents the ratio of interchange from being
as bad as it might otherwise be, but it does not, per se, make
it good.
The most favorable possible terms of trade for a given
country could be attained only when exports were confined
to a single commodity. The least favorable terms possible,
on the other hand, would surely obtain when the export list
comprised all but one of the articles consumed. The larger
the number of exports of any given country relative to the
total number of commodities consumed in that country, the
more certain, therefore, is it that the terms of trade are
tending toward the side unfavorable to it. A wide variety
9. The Theory of International Values Reexamined, loc. cit., p. 63,
note 8.
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of exports from any given country is thus always evidence
that the terms are worse for it than they would be if, under
the same conditions of production, the export list were more
limited. Similarly a narrow list of exports is always evidence
that the terms are better for the country concerned than they
would be if, under the same conditions of production, the
number of exports were larger. The statement that a variety
of exports is a cause of favorable terms can scarcely be recon-
ciled with these facts.
It cannot be denied that a concentration of potential
exports about the optimum ratio for any country will prevent
the ratio of interchange from becoming very unfavorable to
that country, at least until the list of its exports is extended
beyond the range of this concentrated group. It is, however,
not the variety of actually existing exports, but this con-
centration of commodities about the upper rung of the scale
of comparative cost (as against an even dispersion or a con-
centration at the lower end), which has any causal force
whatever in making the terms of trade favorable for the
country concerned. The greater the concentration of poten-
tial exports about this upper rung the greater, of course, is
the assurance that the terms of trade will, on the whole, be
favorable, whether or not the existing export list is wide.
But even here a narrow list of exports will mean more fa-
vorable terms than will a wide one. The less the concentra-
tion of potential exports about the upper rung of the scale
of comparative cost, on the other hand, the more likely are
the terms of trade to be unfavorable, 1 tho here again a small
number of exports will mean more favorable terms than will
a varied list. It is indeed true that a great variety of exports
may not only coincide with fairly favorable as well as with
unfavorable terms but also that, tho the most favorable
terms possible can be secured only when the export list is
1. The terms of trade for such a country might shift from the favor-
able ratio which it would obtain when its export list was very limited
to a quite unfavorable ratio, without bringing any great change in the
general scheme of international values. The only goods which would
be much affected would be those few in the export of which such coun-
try had formerly been concentrating to the exclusion of other countries.
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highly limited, a limited list is no guarantee that the terms
will, in fact, be favorable. But these modifications are very
far from lending any real support to the view that a variety
of exports and favorable terms of trade go hand in hand.
It is, of course, futile to attempt sharply to distinguish
cause and effect in cases of interaction. If it be granted, how-
ever, that the variety of exports from any country tends to
be increased by an adverse movement in the terms of trade,
and that, tho every increase in the number of exports acts
to prevent a further fall in the ratio, the tendency is quickly
counteracted (not eliminated) only in the exceptional case
of a concentration of exports about the upper end of the
scale of existing comparative advantage, we shall not be
likely to follow the orthodox school in associating a variety
of exports with favorable terms of trade. We shall rather
hold to the contrary view, knowing, however, that according
to circumstances both a varied and a narrow list of exports
may coincide with favorable or with unfavorable terms. Of
any given country with a varied export list we can hold both
that, under a given set of conditions of production, the terms
will be less favorable than they would be if the export list
were more limited, and that, if productive conditions were
different, the terms might be worse than they are owing to
the failure of a multiplicity of exports to develop and thus
set so early a check upon an adverse movement in the ratio.
The second of the explicit corollaries of the orthodox
theory to which I would refer is that which is concerned with
the relative gains of large and small countries in international
trade. On the basis of ratios of interchange derived from
hypothetical trading situations selected at random I had
stated, in my former article, that there is no scientific founda-
tion for the orthodox view that small countries, as a result
of the respective strengths of reciprocal national demand,
tend to secure, as against large ones, the greater portion of
such gains. To this contention von Mering properly objects
that one cannot determine the existence of a tendency from
arbitrary, even if random, sampling, and that all that my
examples prove is that small countries do not necessarily
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secure the larger proportional gain from international trade.
He asserts with truth that the existence or non-existence of
the tendency in question can be demonstrated only by per-
mitting the assumed size of one of the countries to vary while
all else remains the same. Supplementing in a systematic
manner, but with one essential logical defect, the examples
I had developed, he reaches the conclusion that the asper-
sions which I had thrown on the dictum that small countries
tend to get the lion's share of the gains from international
trade are unwarranted, and that the orthodox view is right.
I had, in my original article, conceded some validity to this
view in my statement that "the scintilla of truth in the idea
lies in the fact that a small country may be able to specialize
exclusively on a single commodity in which it possesses a
very great comparative advantage and obtain all its imports
through the export of this one commodity."' It is clear that
if a country is, in hypothetical illustrations, allowed to become
all but infinitesimally small, this possibility is always open.
It would normally then give up the production of many of
the commodities it had formerly been exporting and would
secure them, as imports, on better terms than it had formerly
been able to produce them for itself. On the other hand, as
a country grows in size it will approach nearer and nearer
to the scope of a world state. At a point just before such a
hypothetical state had engrossed the whole world it could
obviously not be obtaining any great gains from international
trade, since the terms on which all goods (including that or
those of the small state still outside its orbit) would be
exchanged against one another could not possibly be much
different from those which would prevail were its trade
purely domestic. Every increase in the size of a trading unit,
through a process of annexation, would tend to bring internal
cost of production ratios nearer to the ratios of exchange which
had prevailed in the world at large before the increase in the
size of the given state had occurred (and would still prevail),
and so to make any gain from international trade impossible.
From this it follows that the tendency of any political unit
2. The Theory of International Values Reexamined, loc. cit., p. 83.
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to secure the larger formal share of the gains from interna-
tional trade must vary inversely with size. The larger coun-
tries will obtain in domestic exchanges many of the advan-
tages which international trade gives to the smaller. If a
country, without any change in the volume, or direction, or
terms, of trade should grow larger by annexation of another
state, or should become smaller by scission, it would there-
fore tend respectively to suffer a loss, or register a gain, in
its international trade, merely by reason of the fact that a
converse movement would have taken place in its domestic
trade. The terms on which international trade was being
carried on would have formally moved in one direction or the
other, but there would have been no real loss or gain to any-
one. So far as conditions of this sort are operative it is some-
what misleading, therefore, tho it is formally correct, to say
that small countries tend to secure the greater part of the
gains from international trade.
A favorable formal ratio for any one country, moreover,
frequently issues out of the fact that the country in question
would be extremely inefficient in the production of the goods
it imports. Suppose that such a country, small and inefficient,
were wiped out. It might well happen that this would not
affect at all the world price ratios between the goods it had
formerly exported and those it had imported. One could,
however, say that, while the small country was in existence,
the other countries of the world were trading with it on terms
very unfavorable to them and that, when it had disappeared,
the trade of no country was carried on at quite so unfavorable
a ratio against the world in general as it had formerly been.
The favorable formal ratio at which small countries tend to
carry on their foreign trade is often due to considerations of
this character. When this is the case the unfavorable ratio
obtained by larger countries, as against these smaller countries
only, is a matter of no consequence to such larger countries.
The significant thing for any given country is not the ratio
as against any single foreign political unit (said ratio being
determined by the relative powers of the foreign unit in the
production of the commodities exchanged as much as by its
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own) but the ratio against the foreign world in general. It
is an error to suppose, because a small country trades with
a large one on what are to the small country very favorable
terms, that the larger land is carrying on its foreign trade
at a ratio which leans toward the unfavorable side. As
against third countries, with which it presumably trades in
identical commodities on exactly the same terms as with the
designated small country, it may be securing the major share
of the gains. The error lies in taking different bases of com-
parison. In the one case the basis of comparison covers a
large part or the whole of the international trade of the (small)
country concerned, and therefore gives a good picture of the
advantage of the trade to that country. In the other case
the basis of comparison covers only a very small part of
the total international trade of the (large) country, even in
a single commodity, and therefore gives a very distorted
picture of the relative advantage to the large country of its
total foreign trade even in the single commodity the supply
of which it obtains in part from the small country above
considered.
It is not, however, with such merely formal but with real
shifts in the ratio that von Mering, in his criticism of my
position, is chiefly concerned. In developing his alleged vindi-
cation of the orthodox view, nevertheless, he violates his own
condition of ceteris paribus, and his argument, in consequence,
is wholly without validity. For, in varying the size of the
country with which he is experimenting, he always changes,
both absolutely and relatively to other commodities, the total
world supply of the commodities in which that country spe-
cializes. Now every increase or diminution in the world
supply of any commodity, or group of commodities, all other
factors remaining as before, will of course effect a respectively
adverse or favorable alteration in the ratios at which the
given commodity, or group of commodities, will exchange
against other articles.' Under these conditions von Mering
3. The demand for these commodities, as well as the supply, will,
it is true, inevitably change with a change in the size of any one nation,
no other alteration having taken place. This is true because the given
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has naturally no difficulty in showing, prima facie, that the
size of a country and the favorableness of its trade ratio are
negatively correlated. But really to prove the point one must
show that a variation in size alone, everything else except the
inevitable accompaniments of such a variation being kept
unchanged, will be negatively correlated with favorable terms
of trade. To do this one should again take the case of a coun-
try becoming smaller by scission, or larger by consolidation
with other countries. Let us deal with these cases in order.
If a country should become smaller by scission, both of the
severed parts continuing to produce, in the same volume as
they had formerly done, all of the commodities which had
been produced in the original unit, 4 there would be no change
in the terms on which either of the severed parts would trade
with the outside world. Similarly, a large country trading
freely with a number of small ones would, if the small coun-
tries should be consolidated into a single political unit, obtain
no better ratio of interchange than before from the mere fact
that it happened to be dealing with a large country instead
of a number of small ones.' The same result would follow if,
when the size, and supply of commodities, of any given
country showed a change, the size, and supply of commodi-
ties, of one or a group of other countries producing similar
articles were altered in equal degree in the opposite direction.
All these would be changes in the absolute and relative size
of the several trading countries, all else remaining so far as
possible as before, and they are much nearer the essential
conditions for the test in question than are von Mering's
nation will now consume a different absolute amount of its own products.
But it follows, from the fact of specialization in production, that its
demand for its own products will not increase or decrease proportion-
ately with their supply. Supply factors will, therefore, be dominant.
4. This would occur if neither of the parts had had any comparative
advantage with respect to the other.
5. It should be noted, however, that the newly consolidated state
might secure a worse ratio on its international trade than had any of
its several parts on their international trade while they had remained
independent nations. Much of the gains from international trade would,
simply have been transferred to the domestic account. This is an illus-
tration of a formal (but not a real) adverse movement in the trade
ratio to which attention has already been drawn.
594	 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
assumptions. Since such changes in relative size of the trad-
ing countries would not alter the terms on which any of them
traded, this, I submit, is evidence that size, per se, whatever
its influence in determining the character of reciprocal de-
mand schedules, is not a factor in the distribution of the real
gains from trade. My illustrations taken at random there-
fore gave a valid result, tho it is true that they might not
have done so and that, to make the conclusion irrefutable, it
would be necessary systematically to change the assumed size
of any given country, all else remaining in state quo ante. If
this were done the effect on the ratios of interchange of prod-
ucts would be absolutely nil.
The actual gains from international trade, of large and
small countries alike, depend entirely upon how closely the
ratios, in any given country, of cost of production of all the
commodities involved on either export or import side would,
assuming the production of all of them in the country in
question, correspond with the ratios actually established in
the play of international linked competition. Small countries
simply contribute, and draw from, a general pool of products
which are exchanged against one another on the basis of the
total reciprocal supply (demand) and not on the supply from
any particular source. The alleged tendency for small coun-
tries to secure the larger real gains from international trade
is therefore non-existent. If a small country happens to be
a microcosm, in which the real costs of production of all
commodities reflect with approximate accuracy the exchange
relationships between the various commodities in the world
at large, it will gain little from international trade. On the
other hand, a large country, such as Germany or Russia, may
export manufactured commodities in exchange for raw mater-
ials and foodstuffs, or raw materials and foodstuffs in ex-
change for manufactures, on terms which are very greatly
more favorable to it than those which would prevail if it had
no international trade. Such countries are big gainers from
the international exchange of products. A Jack-of-all-trades
gains little by trading while specialists gain much. Whether
the Jack-of-all-trades is big or little is irrelevant.
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The question whether the terms on which rich countries
carry on international trade tend to lean toward the side
unfavorable to them, as the neoclassical writers maintained
was the fact, is, in the main, a special case of the question of
size; and since size has practically no causal effect on the
terms of trade, neither has richness. It should be pointed out,
however, that a country may be rich not so much because it
is highly productive as because it exchanges its goods against
foreign products on very favorable terms. If the favorable
ratio were the cause of the riches, it would obviously be
untenable to assert that the riches were causal with respect
to the ratio, and that, in addition, they tended to make it
unfavorable.'
The third explicit corollary of the orthodox theory with
which I should like to deal (in some respects allied to that
which has just been considered) is that which correlates with
a sort of combination of volume and "urgency" of a country's
demand for foreign products a tendency toward a rate of
interchange of products unfavorable to that country.' It is
6. A case in point arises in connection with Professor Taussig's
discussion of the trade between Great Britain and India in his Inter-
national Trade (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928). On
page 18 of that book he says that the key to the apportionment of
advantage in international trade is found in the money incomes of
the people of the exchanging countries. Since money incomes are very
high in Great Britain, relatively to money incomes in India, he draws
the conclusion that the terms of the trade between the two countries
are very favorable to Great Britain. (This is more specifically stated
on page 157.) Developing the idea farther he remarks that it is " con-
ceivable that money incomes in the two regions should be the same, and
the gain thus shared equally." I must respectfully dissent from the
views that equal money incomes in Great Britain and India would fur-
nish any evidence that the gains from the trade between the two coun-
tries were being shared equally, that the actual relative incomes provide
any criterion of the actual division of the gains of the trade, or that
there is any proportionate connection between relative money incomes
and the ratio of interchange of products. But I am now concerned
merely to point out that Professor Taussig here regards the relative
riches of Great Britain as an effect of favorable terms and presumably
abandons the orthodox notion that it will be a cause of unfavorable
terms.
7. I had not touched on this topic in the article which von Mering
criticizes, but he develops independently the thesis that urgency of
demand (in the sense that the products concerned are essentials as
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true that if the volume of demand of any country for foreign
products is very great relative to the total foreign demand for
its own products (tho how this could be measured except in
the ratio of interchange of products, which is the quaesitum,
I cannot see), the terms on which such country would trade
with the outside world would, in form at least, be rather
unfavorable to it. But the absolute volume of its demand is of
almost no significance. One could not say offhand whether
such absolutely large demand for foreign products as the
United States, for example, exerts, is or is not large relative
to the total demand of all foreign countries for United States'
products; and one could not, therefore, infer that the abso-
lutely large demand of the United States for foreign products
would render even the formal terms of trade unfavorable to
that country. Still less, it is true, could one say of a country
exchanging wheat for, let us say, silk that the terms of trade
would be likely to lie toward the side favorable to that
country, on the allegation that the demand for wheat is
more " urgent " than that for silk.'
The concept of international demand has quite generally
been formulated with great looseness. There is, for instance,
no real substance in Mill's statement (as quoted and approved
by Marshall) that the countries which carry on their trade
on the most advantageous terms are those whose commodities
are most in demand by foreign countries and which have
them selves the least demand for foreign commodities. One
cannot think of demand apart from price (terms of trade),
and Marshall seems here to have fallen into the error of
approving a method of price analysis which he had repudiated
when he set up his general equilibrium concept of value. At
against more or less dispensable articles) has no general tendency to
produce unfavorable terms of trade but that it is the volume and elas-
ticity of demand which is important. I agree with him about "urgency"
but must take issue with his treatment of volume and elasticity.
8. The matter of elasticity of demand, which has some bearing here,
is reserved for later treatment. All that need now be said is that the
demand for necessities is likely to be less elastic than that for luxuries.
An inelastic demand for foreign commodities, however, is quite as likely
to make the terms of trade favorable to the demander as the reverse.
(See pp. 600 et seq.)
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any given moment, and at any given price, demand cannot
be said to be either strong or weak. If it is demand, and not
merely desire, it is a willingness to buy a certain quantity of
the commodity in question at a certain price. Demand, at
any given price, is therefore a type of quality, like that of a
vacuum, which does not admit of being more or less. Either
it is there or it is not; it cannot be there in greater or less
degree. It is true that, at a certain ratio of interchange be-
tween two products, the amount demanded of one of them
may be more than the amount which will be supplied at that
ratio. The ratio will then move. In this sense of demand,
we may say that, at the original ratio, demand is strong.
Similarly, at a different ratio, it would be weak. No demand
is urgent or weak throughout its course. It is, therefore, quite
as justifiable to say that the ratio determines the respective
strength of reciprocal demands as that the respective strength
of the reciprocal demands determines the ratio. It is conse-
quently impossible to explain the ratio in this way. A general
equilibrium concept of demand, supply, and price is, never-
theless, applicable to international as to all other values, and
it is rather to the notion that national productive units are
not affected by withdrawals from or entry into enterprises as
international value relationships change — a notion implied
in a fixed composition of the export and import lists of any
country regardless of terms of trade — that I most strenu-
ously object. Even on their own chosen ground, however,
the neoclassical economists have failed to make a clear case,
and I should like to call attention to further inconsistencies
in Marshall's standard exposition of the neoclassical posi-
tion. These inconsistencies, deriving from Mill, to whom
Marshall remained persistently loyal, are perhaps not neces-
sarily due to what I believe to be the fundamental fallacy
of the orthodox theory, but they are very closely associated
with it.
In directing my sling at Marshall I cannot but feel much
more diffident than the boy David appears to have felt when
he went to meet Goliath; for however great the stature of the
Biblical giant, his works were clearly evil, whereas Marshall's
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rank high among the great intellectual contributions of our
time. Marshall's most comprehensive treatment of inter-
national values, in his Money, Credit and Commerce, 9 is,
indeed, much below the standard of his original, privately
printed, pamphlet on the subject. 1 For this very reason one
should turn rather from the book to the pamphlet. The latter,
however, Marshall himself described as embodying but an
adjunct to his general theory. For the theory itself we are,
in consequence, compelled to go to Money, Credit and Com-
merce. Such criticism as that theory here evokes can, how-
ever, be made with some assurance of fairness when it is
remembered that what seem to me to be basic errors are
either duplicated in the original pamphlet (and in Appendix J
to Money, Credit and Commerce) or are precluded in the
pamphlet by the fact that Marshall's premises are not neces-
sarily relevant to the supplementary treatment there given.
Marshall says that "there are great differences in char-
acter between the demand of . . . an advanced country and
a backward one . . . Thus, the rich country has less real
benefit from the [international] trade than the poor one, for
just the same reason that, when a rich man makes a fair
exchange with a poor one, giving a thing that is worth a
pound for another that is worth a pound, the real serviceable-
ness to the rich man of what he receives is not likely to be
nearly as great as the real serviceableness to the poor man of
that which is exchanged for it."' This passage occurs in
the chapter on "Elasticity of a Country's Demand for Im-
ports" and seems to imply that the urgency of demand of the
rich country would be relatively weak (Marshall apparently
9. London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1923.
1. Money, Credit and Commerce, tho for the most part written many
years earlier, was rushed into print in the concluding years of Marshall's
life and has obvious imperfections which Marshall, in his more vigorous
years, would presumably have eliminated. It is impossible to distin-
guish mere slips, however, from lapses which are due to erroneous
premises in Marshall's logic, and it seems best to present the case from
the only comprehensive text available. Any specific lapse may be
merely a case of Jupiter nodding, but the whole treatment can, I think,
be designated only in terms of rather deep slumber.
2. Money, Credit and Commerce, p. 168.
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assuming that demand at a given exchange ratio admits of
gradations) and the terms on which it trades, therefore, pre-
sumably good. On the next page, however, Marshall cites
with approval Mill's dictum, already referred to, that the
richest countries tend to gain the least from foreign com-
merce since, having a greater demand for commodities gen-
erally, they are likely to have a greater [stronger?] 3 demand
for foreign commodities, and thus to modify the terms of
interchange to their own disadvantage. With the apparent
intention of supporting this latter proposition he then ad-
vances the view that because a small country depends on
foreign supplies for many things which a country with more
varied resources can produce for herself, her (the small coun-
try's) demand for foreign goods is therefore very eager
[strong?] while the large and rich country can attract foreign
purchases (that is to say, can increase the demand of foreign
consumers for such country's goods) by a great variety of
goods offered for sale. On Marshall's own principles, this
would improve the terms on which the large country would
carry on its trade. Finally, Marshall says that the statement
just made needs to be balanced by others which make for the
opposite conclusion. His prior conclusion from these appar-
ently contradictory arguments he does not state, but that it
is that large and rich countries tend to have an unfavorable
ratio would seem to follow from the sequel which asserts that
large and rich countries have opportunities for developing
new products of which the sale abroad would operate to
improve the terms on which their total trade is carried on
(and so to counteract what would otherwise be an unfavor-
able rate of interchange of products).
In this matter we must, of course, distinguish carefully
between demand, desire, the amount demanded, and demand
schedules. Nor should we fail to use the marginal analysis.
Urgency of desire, for instance, and here also, if one likes,
of " demand," is purely a matter of the relationship between
the existing supply and the amount which would be demanded
at some price (" cost of production," perhaps) which is taken
3. The expressions in brackets are my own interpolations.
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as a standard. It is but very loosely tied up with specific
products. If supply is short, the marginal unit of, let us say,
wheat may be very urgently desired (demanded), but if
wheat exists in plenty the marginal unit may scarcely be
desired (demanded) at all. There thus seems to be no reason
for such common allegations as that the position of the agri-
cultural United States, as against industrialized Europe, was,
in the past, persistently favorable. 4 It is here that elasticity
of demand schedules might be of some significance. But the
significance is not what it is often supposed to be. An inelastic
demand schedule, such as Europe was assumed to have had
for American agricultural products, does not tend to be asso-
ciated in any consistent way with either favorable or unfa-
vorable terms of trade. On the contrary it is characteristic of
an inelastic demand schedule that the terms of trade will,
according to circumstances, vary widely, now veering strongly
toward the favorable and now toward the unfavorable side.
An elastic demand schedule, in turn, has no tendency to fur-
nish either a favorable or unfavorable ratio in international
trade, but at whatever ratio the terms tend to settle it limits
their fluctuations, more especially as against other countries
with similarly elastic demand schedules.
It is on this matter of elasticity of international demand
schedules that the orthodox theory of international values
essentially rests, and I shall now turn from the consideration
of corollaries of the theory to a discussion of its core. It will
still be convenient to deal with the problem in Marshall's
exposition, and here again it will be well first to clear up some
obscurities (which are again not, I think, inherent in the
orthodox theory) before the assault on the main position is
undertaken. Marshall first says that "the elasticity of a
country's demand for imports may be measured by the pro-
portionate increase in that demand, which results from any
movement in her favor of the terms on which she can obtain
4. It is conceivable (not, in my judgment, probable) that the pro-
tective system markedly improved the terms of trade for the United
States, but it does not seem possible that the alleged "urgency" of
demand for American exports could have had any persistent influence
in that direction.
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them."' Conversely, presumably, elasticity of a country's
demand for imports may be measured by the proportionate
decrease in the demand which results from any movement
against her of the terms on which she can obtain them. Dis-
regarding, for the moment ,the implied and impossible assump-
tion of a homogeneous national demand for imports (supply
of exports) regardless of movements in the terms of trade, we
may tentatively accept these definitions without further
objection. In a hypothetical trading situation between two
countries E and G, Marshall then asserts of the case in which
there has been a considerable increase in E's demand for G's
goods (movement of E's demand schedule to the right?),
unaccompanied by any corresponding increase on the part
of G, that "in every possible combination of a large, medium,
or small elasticity on the part of E's demand,' with a large,
medium, or small elasticity on the part of G's demand, one
general rule holds. The more elastic the demand of either
country, the elasticity of demand of the other being given,
the larger will be the volumes both of her exports and of her
imports; but the more also will her exports be enlarged rela-
tively to her imports; or, in other words, the less favor able
to her will be the terms of trade."' I have done my best to
read this perhaps ambiguous passage in such a way as to
make it valid. I have, however, had no success. While valid
for G, 8 the rule will certainly not hold for E. The more elastic
the demand of E, the demand of G being given, the smaller
will be the volume of E's imports and exports,' and the less
will her exports be enlarged relatively to her imports. E's
5. Money, Credit and Commerce, p. 167.
6. In this, and all similar cases, "demand" obviously means "de-
mand schedule."
7. Money, Credit and Commerce, p. 178. Italics mine.
8. The terms of trade will, of course, move in G's favor, but the
movement will be less favorable when G's demand schedule is elastic
than when it is inelastic. Marshall's phrase would have been somewhat
better if he had said "the less favorable to her will be the movement
in terms of trade," rather than "the less favorable to her will be the
terms of trade."
9. As compared, of course, with what they would be if E's demand
were inelastic, not with what they had been before the change in E's
demand schedule.
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demand having increased (shift of the demand schedule to
the right), and the terms of trade having consequently moved
against E, E will, on Marshall's very definition of elasticity,
take a quantity of imports which will vary in inverse relation-
ship with the elasticity of her demand schedule. E's exports,
as well as her imports, will be smaller in volume when her
demand schedule (for imports) shows an elastic trend than
they would be if it were inelastic, both because, her imports
being smaller in volume, fewer exports will, on this account,
be required in payment, and also because the terms of trade
will not be so adverse as they would be were her demand
inelastic. The terms of trade will, of course, have moved
against E, but they will certainly not carry as far in that
direction if her demand for G's goods is elastic as they would
were it inelastic.
Continuing his analysis of trade between E and G, Marshall
a few pages later asserts of the case in which E levies a tax
either on her imports or exports (thus diminishing, at the old
rate of interchange, E's demand for G's goods, or the supply
of her own goods to G) and so moves the terms of trade in
her favor, that " in every possible combination of a large,
medium, or small elasticity on the part of E's demand, with
a large, medium, or small elasticity on the part of G's demand,
one general rule holds. The more elastic the demand of either
country, the elasticity of the demand of the other being given,
the smaller will be the volumes of her exports and her imports:
and the more will her exports be diminished relatively to her
imports; that is the more favorable will be the rate of inter-
change to her.' 4 In the circumstances cited, this rule is again
valid for G but again does not hold for E, and the criticism
which has just been applied to the opposite situation holds,
mutatis mutandis, for this also.
Still holding to the orthodox assumption that the composi-
tion of demand schedules does not change with a shift in the
terms of trade (a valid assumption for short-run phenomena
tho it is impossible for longer periods) we might then modify
Marshall's dicta as follows:
1. Money, Credit and Commerce, p. 185. Italics mine.
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In every possible combination of a large, medium, or small elasticity
of demand on the part of one country for the goods of another with a
large, medium, or small elasticity of demand on the part of the second
country for the goods of the first, some general rules hold. The elasticity
of demand of any country for the products of another (the elasticity of
the reciprocal demand of the other being given) will find a direct correla-
tion in the volume of her exports and of her imports, and in the ratio
of her exports to her imports, in all cases in which her (schedule) demand
decreases relatively to the (schedule) demand in the contrary direction.
Conversely, the elasticity of demand of any country for the products of
another (the elasticity of thereciprocal demand of the other being given)
will find an inverse correlation in the volume of her exports and of her
imports, and in the ratio of her exports to her imports, in all cases in
which her (schedule) demand increases relatively to the (schedule)
demand in the contrary direction.
It is, of course, true that, whatever the demand schedule
of any country may be, the immediate and ulterior effects of
an expansion of its demand for foreign products will be sub-
stantially the opposite of those of a relative contraction.
But when its demand schedule for foreign products is elastic,
the effect both of a relative increase and of a relative decrease
in its (schedule) demand (an immediate unfavorable or fa-
vorable movement respectively in the trade ratio) will be
quickly checked. When, for instance, under an elastic demand
schedule, the (schedule) demand of a country for foreign
products has increased relative to (schedule) demand in the
opposite direction (relative movement of the demand schedule
of the first country to the right) the immediate unfavorable
movement in the ratio of interchange will tend to contract
the volume of imports sharply and the (unfavorable) move-
ment in the ratio of interchange will not go far. So too, on
the same assumption of an elastic demand schedule, when the
(schedule) demand of a country for foreign products has
diminished relative to (schedule) demand in the opposite
direction, the immediate movement in the ratio of inter-
change will tend to expand imports sharply, and here again
the (favorable) movement in the ratio of interchange will not
go far.
On the other hand, when a country's demand schedule for
foreign products is inelastic, the effect both of a relative
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increase and of a relative decrease in its (schedule) demand.
(again an immediate unfavorable or favorable movement re-
spectively in the ratio) will be greatly accelerated. When, for
instance, under an inelastic demand schedule, the (schedule)
demand of a country for foreign products has increased rela-
tive to (schedule) demand in the opposite direction, the imme-
diate unfavorable movement in the ratio of interchange will
not tend to contract the volume of imports very much, and
the (unfavorable) movement in the terms of trade would, on
the assumptions of orthodox theory, proceed indefinitely
(unless the volume of pre existing exports could be rapidly
expanded at some ratio near that formerly prevailing, which
will depend on the counter elasticity or inelasticity of demand
in other countries), until one extreme of the possible ratio of
interchange is reached. So too, on the same assumption of
an inelastic demand schedule, when the (schedule) demand
of a country for foreign products has diminished relative to
(schedule) demand in the opposite direction, the immediate
favorable movement in the rate of interchange will not tend
to expand the volume of imports very much, and the (favor-
able) movement in the terms of trade would proceed indefi-
nitely (unless the volume of preexisting exports were rapidly
contracted at some ratio near that formerly prevailing, which
will depend again on the counter elasticity or inelasticity of
demand in other countries), until the other extreme of the
possible ratio of interchange is attained.
With an elastic demand schedule, movements in the ratio
of interchange of products are thus self-limiting but, with an
inelastic demand schedule, they would be self-accelerating.
Terms would, therefore, tend to be most stable when the
countries vis-a-vis in international trade had reciprocally
elastic demand schedules while they would tend to fluctuate
most wildly when reciprocal demand schedules were inelastic.
If both demand schedules were elastic, movements in the
terms of trade must necessarily be small; if one demand
schedule were elastic and the other inelastic, movements in
the terms of trade would tend to be of medium proportions;
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if both demand schedules were inelastic, movements in the
terms of trade would tend to be large.
Wherever an inelastic demand schedule for foreign products
exists, it would therefore seem possible, if the orthodox theory
of international values be accepted, to effect with comparative
ease a very great shift in the terms of trade, unless those terms
are already at one or the other extreme of the possible ratios
of interchange. Even then it might be possible to shift the
terms to the opposite extreme. A relative increase in the
demand of a country with an inelastic demand schedule
might be brought into being, for instance, through the levy
of, or increase in, tariffs imposed by other countries upon the
import of goods from the country in question. The terms of
trade would then move strongly from any previously exist-
ing favorable position of equilibrium toward the extreme
most unfavorable to that country. On the other hand, a
reduction of tariff barriers in the outside world, or even the
imposition of a tariff by the country with the inelastic demand
schedule,2 would lead to a strong movement of the terms of
trade from any previously existing unfavorable position of
equilibrium toward the extreme most favorable to that
country.
From this it will be evident that, on the principles of the
orthodox theory, any existing equilibrium must be highly
unstable wherever an inelastic demand is present. A small
variation in the terms of trade, arising from any cause, will
evoke a further movement in those terms which will tend to
carry to one or the other of the limits of the possible ratios
of interchange, according as the original movement was or
was not favorable to the country with the inelastic demand
schedule. In such circumstances one wonders just how such
a Humpty-Dumpty as an intermediate ratio could ever have
got up on the wall at all, and what could have kept him there
up to the time that he eventually topples to one side or the
2. Such a tariff would diminish the national demand for foreign
products somewhat. This would lead to more favorable terms. But
the better terms would not proportionately increase the country's con-
sumption of foreign products and the favorable movement in the terms
would thus tend to continue.
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other. It is, in fact, logically inevitable, on the premises of
orthodox theory, that, should any country have an inelastic
demand schedule, the terms of trade would tend to settle at
one or the other (one could not say which) of the extremes of
the possible ratio of interchange of its products for those of
foreign countries. If the reader will refer to Mill's treatment
of the topic, he will find that Mill here found himself on the
horns of a dilemma. His reasoning led him to the conclusion
just stated; but as it did not, in fact, seem that countries
actually carried on their international trade on this basis, he
was led to search for some principle which would establish
equilibrium somewhere between the extremes of the ratio.
The " Equation of International Demand " which Mill first
advanced as a solution of his problem was no solution at all.
To say that "the produce of a country exchanges for the
produce of other countries at such values as are required in
order that the whole of her exports may exactly pay for the
whole of her imports " 3 is a mere truism. For, at whatever
values the exports exchange for imports, the whole of the
exports will exactly pay for the whole of the imports. It is
hard to know how else the imports could be obtained. The
" Equation," moreover, under an inelastic demand schedule,
would in any event be attained only at one of the extremes
of the ratio. Mill's elaborate attempt to improve, in a later
edition, this first halting effort at establishing the principle
determinative of the rate of interchange, and to bring any-
thing approaching exactitude into his treatment, breaks down
completely. Marshall recognized this, but his sense of reality
also would not permit him to drive his logic to the point
where Mill had balked. He therefore says that, while his
chapter on elasticity of international demand seems needed
in order to develop the study of international trade in the
abstract, it has not much bearing on pressing practical prob-
lems since, as he asserts, the demand of no significant country
for its imports, as a whole, is very inelastic.'
3. Principles of Political Economy, Book III, Ch. XVIII, §4.
4. Marshall, indeed, was disposed to regard his whole process of
reasoning on elasticity and inelasticity of demand schedules as an intel-
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This assertion of Marshall's is not only unproven but
seems to be contrary to fact. Reciprocal demand and recip-
rocal supply are, of course, the same thing, but it will be well
here to direct attention to supply, since from this angle the
facts will appear more clearly to the reader. It frequently
occurs that the supply of a given product, from all countries
which specialize therein, is, for considerable periods at any
rate, very inelastic. This is markedly true of some agricul-
tural commodities. If, as often happens, the demand for such
products is also inelastic, the terms on which countries spe-
cializing in such products carry on trade with the outside
world may fluctuate so widely as to induce the most extreme
vicissitudes in the prosperity of those countries. Tho the
demand for sugar is perhaps not particularly inelastic, the
supply seems to be; and since an inelastic supply represents
a relatively inelastic demand for foreign products on the part
of countries specializing in sugar, we have seen Cuban raw
sugar in bond, in a little more than a decade, fall from twenty
cents to less than one cent a pound in the New York market.
Cuba has, in consequence, passed from a stage of high pros-
perity to destitution. This very striking case is paralleled in
about the same degree in the case of rubber from British
Malaya, and, in much lesser degree, in that of other agri-
cultural products from Canada, Australia, Argentina, Russia,
and other countries.
The present exchange ratios between the exports and
imports of such countries are probably but short-time mal-
adjustment phenomena which transcend, in some cases at
any rate, the limits of ratios of interchange as determined by
conditions of comparative cost. They cannot, therefore, pre-
sent a stable equilibrium. But the terms of trade will not,
lectual toy, interesting, but far removed from the realm of practicality.
For the purpose to which it was applied, viz., the determination of
long-run ratios of interchange, it was, I am convinced, not only a toy
but also tawdry. For short-run ratios, however, (for the period, that is,
during which reciprocal supply is being adjusted to changed terms of
trade) it was far from being a toy but was, and remains, of importance
in the world of practical affairs as well as in that of mental abstractions.
To this matter more detailed attention will presently be given.
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as Marshall asserts, shift back to less extreme ratios because
the demand of any large country for a given range of products
is " normally " elastic. It is here that the accepted theory of
international values irremediably breaks down. The solution
of the problem involves the complete abandonment of that
theory with its unreal, and indeed impossible, trappings of
" ideal " commodities, or "representative bales" of exports
and imports, and its reliance on the allegedly elastic character
of reciprocal demand schedules. A direct attack on its basic
postulates will proceed from the position that, with any large
movement in the terms of trade, certain products will eventu-
ally be shifted from the export to the import list of some of
the countries to which the movement in the terms is unfavor-
able, and will be replaced in the domestic production of such
countries by other commodities, formerly imported, which
it will now pay to produce at home, either fully or for a larger
proportion of consumption than hitherto. Certain of these
former imports may even enter the export lists of such
countries. Either movement would be effective, in some
degree, in preventing any strong permanent shift in the ratio
of interchange, even if only two countries were involved in
international trade, provided they were trading in more than
two products. But it is always effective, and in a shorter
interval, in the world as it is where many countries are in
commercial contact with one another. Through the force of
linked competition, any shift in the terms at which one inter-
nationally traded product exchanges for another, no change
having taken place in relative real costs of production, will,
within a not very extended period, thus tend to be well-nigh
completely counteracted regardless of the elasticity of the
demand (supply) schedules of any given country, or countries,
specializing in the commodities in question. To take a spe-
cific example, such as wheat, it may well be that Russia,
Argentina, Canada and some other exporting countries would
suffer a very strong adverse movement in the terms on which
wheat would exchange for other commodities (no change, let
us assume, having taken place in relative real costs of pro-
duction), without shifting to other commodities in marked
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degree and thus without materially reducing the supply of
wheat put upon the market. But the United States, and
many other producers of wheat, have alternatives to wheat
production, and when wheat offers relatively unfavorable
returns, such countries will sooner or later shift, to some
extent, from wheat to other products. The pressure on wheat
prices having been thus relieved, and the pressure on prices
of other products having been increased, something close to
the old exchange relationship will be restored. It is not even
necessary that the country or countries in which the adjust-
ment is made should be exporters of the product in question.
Certain countries may reduce a domestic production which
is already insufficient for home consumption and thus increase
the demand for imports of this product. Shifting to other
products they will increase the supply and reduce the import
demand for these. With any movement, therefore, in the
terms at which products exchange against one another, any
country which is a marginal producer of any part of the
supply of the commodities against which the movement in
the terms has taken place, whether or not it is an exporter
thereof, will tend to shift to such of those commodities favored
by the movement in the ratio as had formerly been just extra-
marginal for it. The production of exports, as well as of the
internal supply in all countries, of the commodities disfavored
by the alteration in the ratio will consequently decrease rela-
tively to the production of exports, as well as of the internal
supply in all countries, of the commodities favored by the
alteration in the ratio. This will always operate to reestab-
lish something like the former terms of trade. Since, in the
actual world, there is a continuous gradation in the advan-
tage of production in any one country of more or less of one
product or another, even a very slight shift in the terms at
which products exchange relative to their real costs of pro-
duction in any country will rather quickly set in motion com-
pensating forces. In other words, the marginal analysis
applies here fully as much as to individual commodities in a
single market.
The significant differences, in practical conclusions, which
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issue out of the approach to the problem of international
values which I have here and formerly suggested, from those
which issue out of the approach of the neoclassical school,
may be illustrated by an examination of a treatment, on
orthodox lines, of the trade between Great Britain and India.
As already noted, this topic is touched upon in the early
pages of Professor Taussig's standard work, International
Trade, but it is taken up more fully in a later chapter of that
book.' Asserting that India, as well as England, has an abso-
lute advantage in the production of its own specialties,
Professor Taussig attributes the unfavorable trade ratio, and
the equally unfavorable incomes, of the people of India to
the character (elasticity, etc.) of the respective demand
schedules of the two countries for each other's products.
Professor Taussig's reasoning, however, involves him in an
embarrassment (with respect to the presumptive and actual
flow of specie) which he frankly admits. " In truth," he says,
"the case is troublesome. I am not at all sure that it can be
reconciled with the hypotheses and conclusions which have
been set down in the preceding chapters." For my own part,
I am convinced that the difficulty is traceable to the erroneous
fundamental postulates of the neoclassical theory.
The terms of trade between Great Britain and India, as I
conceive the matter, are determined in the following fashion.
India produces, among other things, at an absolute as well
as at a comparative advantage with respect to Great Britain,
the commodity tea. Whether the foreign demand for tea is
"urgent" or not, elastic or inelastic, India, together with
other countries, produces so much tea that the price of tea
has fallen to the point where it is equally advantageous for
the natives of India to produce jute, cotton, wheat, etc. for
export. In so doing they become competitively linked with
other countries as, for example, the United States. Cotton
and wheat of a given grade must sell at the same price in
any market, whether they have been produced in India, the
United States, or elsewhere. In the long-run a given grade
of labor producing cotton or wheat in the United States must,
5. Page 157 et seq.
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on the assumption of internal mobility of labor, obtain the
same wages as similar labor will obtain in textile factories,
steel-making, and the like. In the latter case the products
will impinge upon the exports of Great Britain. Tea pro-
duction in India is thus tied, through the international price
structure, to the prices of textiles and steel in Great Britain.
Productive conditions being unchanged, the price of tea will
bear a definite long-run relationship to that of cotton or
wheat so long as India produces and exports all of these
products, while the prices of cotton and wheat will bear a
definite long-run price relationship to those of textiles and
steel so long as the United States produces and exports all
of these. British textiles and steel, grade for grade, will sell
in export markets at the same prices as similar American
products, and the prices of tea, cotton, and wheat (India's
exports) are thus definitely related, via the U.S.A., to those
of textiles and steel (Britain's exports). " Urgency " and
elasticity of international demand schedules are irrelevant.
The native of India, whether he raises tea, cotton, or wheat,
will obtain a (money) income, relative to that of the Amer-
ican, which will be in proportion to his productivity in wheat
or cotton as against the productivity of the American grower
of the latter commodities. The American worker of a given
grade, whether growing wheat or cotton, or working in a
textile or steel mill, will, in turn, obtain a (money) income,
relatively to that of his British cousin, which will be in pro-
portion to respective productivities in export textiles or steel.
The money income of the British worker is in this, and in no
other, way indirectly but very definitely linked with the
money income of the native of India. That the income of the
native of India is low is due to the fact that he has low abso-
lute productivity in India's marginal export commodities,
while that of the British worker in Britain's marginal export
commodities is fairly high.
The terms of trade are, in fact, rather unfavorable to India.
This is shown, not by the relative height of British and
Indian incomes, but by the circumstance that India is, in
late years, entering more and more into the production of
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several typically British goods, while there is no possibility
of Britain's entering into the production of most of the
typically Indian goods. Rather is England steadily with-
drawing from the relative production of certain Indian com-
modities such as wheat. This all means that England is get-
ting the greater share of the gains from the trade. Great
Britain is thus somewhat richer, and India somewhat poorer,
than if the terms were more favorable to India. The over-
whelming reason for the great difference in incomes, how-
ever, is not the ratio of interchange but the disparity in
absolute productivity of the workers in the marginal export,
and in most of the domestic, commodities of each country.
The ratio of interchange is a minor factor which could be of
decisive importance only in the case of small countries with a
limited number of exports. If India should greatly raise her
absolute per capita productivity in all agricultural products,
the terms of trade with Great Britain would, in the absence
of other changes, become even more adverse, but the dis-
parity between British and Indian incomes would neverthe-
less tend to disappear. The present terms of trade are unfa-
vorable to India because the relative cost of production, in
India, of all of the various commodities exchanged in both
directions is closer to their relative cost of production in the
world at large than is the case with Great Britain. This is,
of course, a more or less fortuitous situation which happens
to be unfavorable to India. But the low level of Indian
incomes is so much more due to deficiencies in absolute pro-
ductivity, over a range of products sufficient to employ the
whole Indian population, that India need not devote any
excessive concern to the terms of trade. In any case, so long
as productive conditions in India and in the outside world
remain substantially as at present, there is no possibility of
changing the ratio of interchange very much. The character
of the British demand schedule for imports from India, or of
the Indian demand schedule for imports from Britain, is in
no way responsible for the situation.
The ratios at which products exchange in international
trade are dependent at any given moment solely upon recip-
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rocal supply (demand), but reciprocal supply is, in the long
run, dependent upon these ratios. Stable equilibrium is
approached through an interacting movement in the amounts
reciprocally supplied and in the terms of trade. Any given
country adapts itself to the general situation, on the principle
of opportunity cost, in such a way as to provide as large a
return as possible to its entrepreneurs and, assuming free
internal competition, to its population in general.
It has already been noted that in a complex trading situa-
tion, under given conditions of production and comparative
costs, long-run equilibrium is possible only within an ex-
tremely narrow range of the terms of trade. Those terms,
however, may shift markedly with changes in conditions of
production, whether or not any given country is sharing in
such changes, and this may cause a marked alteration in the
prosperity of the given country.' But this, again, has nothing
to do with elasticity of demand, and on the basis of the
exposition so far given we might conclude that the character
of the demand or supply schedule of any given country, and
even a shift of its whole demand schedule for foreign products
to the right or left, will have almost no effect upon the long-
run ratio of interchange of internationally traded products.
Using the theory, and the method, which was developed in
my earlier article von Mering has now shown, however, that
when new factors, such as an increase or decrease in the
population of any given country, are changing the volume of
its production, there is, in the process of transition to the
new terms of trade which are inevitable if the increase or
decrease in production continues (and which will not be
greatly different from those which had formerly prevailed),
a short stage within which, if the process of increase or
decrease in production were stopped, the ratio might (1)
permanently retain its existing status, (2) shift to that which
will, in any case, eventuate if the process should go on, (3)
6. The shift in the terms of trade would be more or less nominal
(cf. Marshall, Money, Credit and Commerce, p. 333) for those countries
in which the change in conditions of production corresponded more or
less fully with the change in terms, but it would be real for other
countries.
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fluctuate between these points. It is only in such a stage of
limbo (a rather abnormal situation) that elasticity or inelas-
ticity of the demand schedule of the country in question, or
of any other country, would be of some slight significance in
throwing the balance one way or the other. The final con-
clusion, therefore, on elasticity (or inelasticity) in demand
schedules, as a factor in determining the long-run ratios of
interchange of products, is that it may have some effect in
unusual situations which may conceivably be permanent
tho they are not, in fact, likely to be; and, even then, that
it is operative only to the extent of shifting the ratio to one
or the other limit of a very narrow range. This necessarily
small range of movement in the long-term equilibrium ratios
almost completely removes the sting from the classical " dem-
onstration" that an improvement in productive powers
might so change the terms of trade as to result in permanent
substantial loss to the country in which the improvement
occurred, that protection might, through a converse shift in
the terms, result in a permanent substantial gain to the
country in which it was applied, or that taxation can, in any
important degree, be thrust upon the "foreigner."
So far as short-run effects are concerned, however, the
neoclassical analysis is of great value. The neoclassicists,
nevertheless, have said little or nothing on this point. Their
theory was supposed to be a long-run theory. It is really
valid, however, only as an explanation of a more or less
immediate situation. In periods too short to permit of shift-
ing of resources through the gradual process of the decay of
existing fixed capital and the growth of new forms thereof,
in a word, too short to permit of a change in long-run con-
ditions of supply, the character of demand schedules is,
indeed, of predominating import. Where inelastic demand
(or immediate supply) schedules are involved, moreover,
short-run changes in the terms of trade may be very violent.
The ratio then frequently goes quite beyond even that wide
range set by conditions of comparative cost on the assump-
tion of a fixed composition of export and import lists. The
data of the orthodox analysis would have to be changed to
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL VALUES
	 615
meet this situation, but the method would be applicable. For
this purpose Marshall's geometrical and algebraic supple-
ment (as given in Appendix J to Money, Credit and Com-
merce) is to be highly treasured. Short-run phenomena,
moreover, are sometimes affected but slowly by the forces
making for long-run equilibria. At the present time, for in-
stance, any transition toward the long-run equilibrium posi-
tion appropriate to such permanent disturbance as may have
occurred in the years just prior to the outbreak of depression
is hindered by the prevailing uncertainty and by the fact that
all goods now seem difficult of sale. In such circumstances
" short-time " phenomena may dominate the situation for a
rather lengthy period. The position of countries for whose
products demand schedules " curl round " when supply is
unduly extended may then become acutely serious.
Elasticity or inelasticity of national demand schedules
being a factor of almost no importance in fixing the long-run
terms of trade, and " urgency " of national demand being of
no greater significance, the whole structure of orthodox inter-
national value theory, which was superimposed upon Ri-
cardo's exposition of the principle of comparative cost, falls
to the ground. The principle of comparative cost must still
be the cornerstone of the theory of international values (we
should think, however, rather in terms of opportunity than
of other types of cost) ; but we must abandon reciprocal
demand, unmodified by a change in ratios of interchange,
as an explanation of anything other than short-time phenom-
ena. It is not without interest that this was the whole trend
of Marshall's reasoning, as against the ideas of Jevons with
respect to the general theory of value.
The analysis of the method of determination of inter-
national values made in my former article leads to ratios
more definite, on the basis of given suppositions, than those
which Marshall was able to obtain on the impossible assump-
tion of an unchanged composition of "representative bales,"
and it precludes the possibility of several widely different
sets of ratios of interchange meeting equally well the require-
ments of stable equilibrium. The curves of long-run national
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demand (supply) schedules for foreign products cannot, I
think, reach the " curling round " stage if there be anything
like free internal mobility of the factors of production in the
various countries concerned. My own feeling is that national
reciprocal long-run demand schedules for foreign products,
whatever their character, cannot even be posited or drawn,
since changes in the terms of trade make the homogeneous
units, necessary to the construction of such schedules, im-
possible. We can, however, in the absence of such schedules,
determine the ratios of interchange by the method outlined
in my earlier article provided we have demand and real-cost
schedules for the various commodities in the various coun-
tries concerned.
It is well, perhaps, to emphasize the fact that the objec-
tions I have raised in this article to the theory of international
values, as developed by Mill and his successors, do not apply
to the classical theory of international trade as developed by
Ricardo, who left the matter of international values quite
untouched. So far as international values are concerned, it
seems to me that Mangoldt, Cliffe-Leslie, and Sidgwick
adumbrated doctrines which are much nearer the truth than
those of more generally accepted writers, and that, if these
doctrines had been developed instead of having been neg-
lected in favor of the work of the neoclassicists, we should
not have been wandering in the wilderness for more than the
alloted span of forty years but might before now have
reached that promised land of settled questions in which
Mill was rash enough to think that the men of his time had
firmly set their feet.
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